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By V. D. L.
THE NEW CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEAL.
The nomination by the President of seven out of the
nine judges of the new Circuit Courts of Appeal is an
event of no little importance to the bar and to the country.
We, as yet, scarcely realize the part which these new courts
are destined so play in the development of private law in
the United States. The primary object of the act was to
relieve the Supreme Court. While there is, undoubtedly,
a steady decrease in the relative amount of litigation, the
rapid growth of our country threw upon the Supreme
Court, under the old rules of appeal, such a volume of busi-
ness that the deliberation necessary to insure the permanent
value of its work was rapidly becoming impossible. Lat-
terly the most potent factor in the increase of the business
of the Supreme Court was the delay attendant on an appeal,
and this delay increased the advantage of an appeal to the
defendant against whom an adverse decision had been ren-
dered. One cause thus reacted on the other, the increase
in the work of the court increased the delay, and the delay
increased the work. Relief was essential. And on the
passage of the act by the last Congress, the fact that this re-
lief had been secured, not the importance of the tribunals
which had been created, was uppermost in the minds of
the profession.
We now, however, have had time to realize that prac-
tically all those cases in which the decision involves the
application or the further development of the common law
will hereafter be brought into these new courts for what, in
most cases, means final revision. The interpretation of the
laws of the several States, as far as the jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts renders such interpretation necessary, also
devolves upon the Circuit Courts of Appeal. To them is
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given the final interpretation of the patent laws, criminal
laws and revenue laws of Congress, together with the de-
cision in Admiralty cases.
Under their review, though with a right to an appeal
to the Supreme Court, pass all cases involving the inter-
pretation of the laws of Congress, excepting always where
the constitut'onality of the law is drawn in question. In
that event the case, as all other constitutional cases, passes
directly from the Circuit or District Court in which it arose
to the Supreme Court of the United States.
As far as the Federal Courts are concerned, with the
exception of international law which depends upon the
construction of treaties of the United States, and of the
law involved in the decision of a "prize cause," the new
courts have almost as wide a jurisdiction, and can affect as
profoundly the development of law in this country, as the
High Court of Justice in England. What is left to the
Supreme Court of the United States is that body of Con-
situtional Law which embraces the relations of the in-
dividual citizen to the local and central governments, and
the relations of these governments to each other, together
with the comparatively unimportant duty of interpreting
the statutes passed by Congress, with the exceptions above
noted.
Besides establishing nine new courts whose importance
can hardly be estimated, the act introduces a distinctly new
feature into our system of appeals. Decrees of the Court
of Appeals are made final in the cases mentioned, only on
condition that the Supreme Court permits them to be final.
The parties in the cause cannot appeal as a matter of right.
The appellate court is itself made the sole judge of the
expediency of the appeal, except that the members of the
Court of Appeals have the right to certify to the Supreme
Court any question of law on which they desire the instruc-
tions of the Superior Court.
The principle that the members of the appellate
court should be the judges of the right of appeal, is a dis-
tinct step in advance, because it is a recognition of new
conditions and an attempt to adjust ourselves to them.
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As long as the nation was comparatively small, and the
number of litigated cases was insignificant, the custom of
allowing a certain amount of money to be the sole factor
in determining whether a case should be appealed to the
one Supreme Court for authoritative revision produced ex-
cellent results. It gave an unity to Federal law, and the
delays of appeal were not so great as to defeat the ends of
justice. This mechanism enabled the courts to deliver
opinions with reasonable promptitude on unsettled questions
of law, and thus the law on any point would be finally de-
termined, and not left in doubt for an indefinite period.
But with our growth as a nation this old mechanism is
evidently unsuitable. Allowing the counsel in the causes
to be the sole judges of the expediency of an appeal chokes
the appellate courts with cases which involve no new
principle of law, and only serves to delay indefinitely the
discussion of cases upon which the profession may feel a
reasonable doubt. Appellate courts were rapidly coming
to a point where they were doing more harm, by delaying
the execution of the just decrees of the lower courts, than
good in elucidating the law.
The change in the mechanism by which a case is ap-
pealed to a final tribunal, if it proves satisfactory in prac-
tice, will have a much wider effect than simply to relieve
the Supreme Court of the United States and improve the
efficiency of the Federal Courts. The development of law
in the United States and the interpretation of the local
State statutes, at present, labor under a twofold disadvan-
tage, which springs practically from the same source. We
have forty-odd States, each with its Supreme Court, each
interpreting its own statutes and the principles of common
law to suit itself. On the other hand, the Federal Courts,
having frequently to interpret the statutes of the various
States, often take the liberty of construing them in such away
that their practical effect is totally different from that given
to them by the courts of the State. Sooner or later this
confusion will become intolerable, and then the fact that it
is possible, in spite of the great amount of litigation, to
have one Supreme Court, where the court itself is made the
EDITORIAL NOTES.
judge of the advisability of the appeal, and that practically
all the advantages of the appellate court are retained,
may be the determining factor which will lead to a prac-
tical consolidation of the State and Federal Judiciary.
IN RE LAU OW BEW, PETITIONER.
The case of Lau Ow Bew, petitioner, decided by the
Supreme Court on the 16th of last November,' is the first
case which involves the construction of Section 6 of the
act establishing the new Circuit Courts of Appeal. This
section provides that the judges of the Courts of Appeal, in
cases where their judgment would otherwise be final, may
certify questions of law to the Supreme Court, or that the
Supreme Court on petition may issue a writ of certiorari to
have the entire record brought before them. The facts of
the case also suggested an interesting question as to the
jurisdiction of the new Circuit Courts of Appeal, as also
the proper construction of the Chinese Exclusion Acts.'
It seems that the petitioner, Lau Ow Bew, was a nat-
ural-born subject of the Emperor of China. For the past
seventeen years he had been a resident of the United
States. He was, or rather is, a *merchant in the city of
Portland, Oregon, having a one-fourth interest in a firm
which does over $ioo,ooo worth of business annually. In
September, 189o, he left the United States on a temporary
visit to China. On the eleventh day of last August he ar-
rived on his return voyage in San Francisco. The Collector
of the Port refused to allow him to land, on the ground that,
although before leaving he had procured satisfactory evidence
of his status as a merchant, according to the regulations in
that respect of the Treasury Department (which proofs he
produced to the satisfaction of the Collector), and although he
'Reported in p. 583, Vol. 142, of the United States Supreme
Court Reports.
2 An act to execute certain treaty stipulations relating to Chinese,
approved May 6, 1882, 22 Stat., 58, c. 126, as amended July 5, 1884, 23
Stat., 115, C. 220.
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was entitled to protection under the treaties between our
Government and China, he had failed to comply with the
sixth section of the Act of Congress last above mentioned.
This section provides That every Chinese person, other
than a laborer, who may be entitled by said treaty or this
act to come within the United States, and who shall be
about to come to the United States, shall obtain the per-
mission of and be identified as so entitled by the Chinese
Government or such other foreign government of which at
the time such Chinese person shall be subject." The
treaty" referred to is the one of November 17, i88o, which
provided that Chinese, other than laborers, should have
the right, without conditions or restrictions, to come, re-
main in, and leave the United States, and enjoy all privi-
leges, immunities and exemptions enjoyed by the citizens
of the United States in China. The Collector of the Port
remanded Lau Ow Bew to the custody of the captain of
the ship on which he had arrived. He was brought before
the Circuit Court on a writ of habeas corfius. The Circuit
Court dismissed the petition, and remanded the petitioner
to custody. From this judgment an appeal was presented
to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
That Court sustained the ruling of the Circuit Court, and
refused to certify any question of law to the Supreme
Court. Whereupon a petition was filed in the Supreme
Court for a writ of certiorari.
The case in the Circuit Court had been decided on the
ruling of the Supreme Court in Wan Sing v. United
States,' in which it was held that one who came to this
country at the age of 16, remained two years, and then re-
turned to China, where lie passed seven years, was required
to bring certificates of identification from the Government
of China. The Supreme Court in the present case decided
that the decision relied on by the Circuit Court presented
such a different state of facts that it could not be said to
rule the present case; and as the present case involved the
construction of a statute, whose true meaning must be de-
termined by reading it in the light of our treaties with
140 U. S., 424.
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China, and of the principles of international law, it was a
question of importance which should have been certified
to the Supreme Court, and, therefore, the Court granted
the petition for a writ of certiorari to bring the record of
the case before them. Chief Justice FULLER, in the con-
cluding sentence of the opinion, says: "While, therefore,
this branch of our jurisdiction should be exercised spar-
ingly and with great caution, we are of the opinion that
the ground of this application is sufficient to call for our
interposition."
It is by no means certain that the Court of Appeals
had jurisdiction of the case. In fact, the Supreme Court
only assumes the jurisdiction "for the purposes of the
present discussion." The fifth section of the act establish-
ing the Circuit Courts of Appeal provides: "That appeals
or writs of error may be taken from the District Courts or
from the existing Circuit Courts direct to h e Supreme
Court in the following cases :
"In any case in which tie constitutionality of any
law of the United States, or the validity or constru ction of
any treaty made under its authority is drawn in question."
The sixth section of the act deprives the Circuit Courts
of Appeal of jurisdiction in all cases which may be taken
direct to the Supreme Court.
The piece of legislation which is called in question is,
it is true, an Act of Congress, and as'such should be con-
sidered by the Courts of Appeal. But the act was passed,
ostensibly, at least, to carry out the provisions of a treaty,
and certainly must be interpreted in the light of that
treaty. Whether it is ultimately decided that similar
cases should go direct from the Circuit Court to the
Supreme Court, or that the Circuit Courts of Appeal have
jurisdiction, no one can doubt, in the light of the decision
in Lau Ow Bew, the convenience of the former method.
For if the rule is to be followed, that every case which
involves indirectly the construction of a treaty is of suffi-
cient importance to be certified to the Supreme Court, it
would greatly expedite a final decision of the cause to take
the case directly to that court, which alone can give a final
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decision. The intervention of any other court is practi-
cally worse than useless. It simply multiplies tribunals.
The true construction of the treaties with China and the
Restriction Acts as applied to the facts of this case, which
will soon receive authoritative exposition by the Supreme
Court, is one involved in considerable doubt. The treaty
of i88o provides that Chinese, other than laborers, may
come and go to the United States as the citizens of any
other nation. The Restriction Act of 1884 was evidently
passed in good faith to carry out the true intent of this
treaty. This intent is set forth in its opening paragraph :
" Whereas in the opinion of the Government of the
United States the coming of Chinese laborers to this
country endangers the good order of certain localities, etc."
Laborers who are within the United States ninety days
subsequent to the adoption of the treaty are permitted to
return to China or elsewhere on business or pleasure, and
subsequently to re-enter the United States.
For the purpose of their identification the fourth sec-
tion of the act provides that, on leaving the United States,
they may obtain a certificate from the Collector of the
Port, which certificate on their return identifies them and
establishes their right to re-enter our country. No per-
mission or identification on the part of the Chinese Gov-
ernment is required. Such identification as applied to
persons who have a right to enter the country because of
their previous residence would be useless. The purpose
of the identification provided for in the sixth section of
the act is to enable the Collector to determine whether
the person seeking admission for the first time is a mer-
chant. It is evident that the framers of the law never
contemplated the case of a Chinese merchant resident in
the United States desiring to visit his native country. To
ask him to obtain identification as a merchant from the
Government of China is absurd. On the other hand, the
terms of the act providing a method of identification. of
Chinese who have left this country for a short time is
confined by the terms of the act to Chinese laborers.
Either, therefore, there is no necessity for the identifica-
